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Burgeoning populations are increasing municipal water demand in Colorado, a 
phenomenon that is changing rural and urban economies.  Agricultural water is a 
preferred source for meeting growing demands, but transfers often require formerly 
irrigated land to be fallowed, thus removing a key industry from rural regional 
economies.   
 
One alternative to such ‘buy and dry’ strategies that is gaining interest allows farmers to 
lease a portion of their water portfolio to cities.  Water is made available for lease as 
farmers fallow their land on a rotational basis or reduce the consumptive use of their 
cropping operations by limiting irrigation.   
 
But will farmers adopt limited irrigation strategies if water lease markets materialize?  
This research considers whether farmers are willing to sign leases if suitably 
compensated; what remuneration is needed for a farmer to enter into a lease agreement; 
how much water the farmer will release when compensated; what provisions are desired 
in a lease agreement; and what characteristics are shared by farmers willing to lease.   
 
Research results are useful for policymakers who may need to alter existing institutions 
so that the transactions costs of leases do not outweigh the potential gains from trade, and 
for farmers and municipal water providers actively engaged in developing water leasing 
alternatives.   
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
  
As Colorado’s population continues to grow and urbanize, water will continue to be 
reallocated from agricultural to M&I uses.  The significant negative impacts associated 
with permanent rural to urban water transfers call into question the economic viability 
and social acceptability of such transfers.   
 
While individual buyer and seller presumably benefit from the transaction, stakeholders 
believe that rural economies are at risk. An economic incentive exists for water transfers 
and, presumably, the buyer and seller of water in a market transaction gain from the 
transfer.  However, rural to urban water transfers often require formerly irrigated land to 
be fallowed, which removes a key base industry from rural regional economies and 
affects more than just the buyer and seller—third parties such as local governments and 
other local businesses are affected as well.  There are reductions in retail trade associated 
with agriculture, which may in turn spur population out migration.  Impacts are felt by 
businesses and local governments whose property and sales tax base is eroded due to the 
lower appraised value of land as it is taken out of irrigation (Pritchett, Frasier, and 
Schuck, 2003).  Additionally, there are environmental concerns regarding erosion, weed 
control, and the loss of open space.     
 
The Statewide Water Supply Initiative (SWSI) has projected the population, annual water 
demand, and the resultant reduction in irrigated acres in Colorado by the year 2025 
(Table 1).  Using SWSI’s projections, Thorvaldson and Pritchett (2006) estimate the 
economic activity generated by irrigated agriculture and the economic impact of reduced 
irrigated acreage in three of Colorado’s river basins (Table 1).   
 
Table 1. Economic activity generated by irrigated agriculture and economic impacts of reduced 
irrigated agriculture
a 
Basin  Population 
Increase  
Additional 







Arkansas  55%  98,000 AF  47,500   $20,300,000  $428 
Rio Grande  35%  43,000 AF  80,000   $107,000,000  $1,235 
South Platte  65%  409,700 AF  159,500   $110,100,000  $690 
aPopulation, water demand and lost irrigated acres drawn from SWSI (Colorado Water Conservation Board, 
2004).  Thorvaldson and Pritchett (2006) provide economic impact and economic activity estimates. 
 
Notable is the South Platte, which expects to fallow as many as 266,000 (twenty two 
percent) of its irrigated acres in the next twenty five years.  Each irrigated acre generates 
significant economic activity in the basin, so potential losses are substantial in sparsely 
populated rural areas with few other alternatives.  Impacts include the direct impacts via 
loss of crop sales; indirect impacts via lost revenues to agribusinesses that supply 
irrigated farms; and induced impacts via lost wages spent by affected employees. 
 A viable and healthy agriculture industry is essential to maintaining the economic, social, 
and cultural integrity of many rural communities.  It is no surprise that large scale 
transfers are greeted with highly charged, emotionally contentious debates.  Thus, the 
viability of emerging alternatives to permanent transfers needs to be examined.  
 
Some stakeholders believe that temporary water leases in place of permanent transfers 
may avoid these negative externalities.  Some form of limited irrigation is better for the 
regional economy compared to fallowing or converting large swaths of land to dryland 
cropping.  Simply put, limited irrigation provides greater direct, indirect and induced 
economic activity.  While not as large as the economic activity under full irrigation, the 
economic activity generated by limited irrigation is greater than that for dryland cropping 
(Pritchett, 2007).  Importantly, the limited irrigation cropland remains in production so 
that rural economies suffer reduced effects compared to buy and dry activity. 
 
Rotational fallowing and limited irrigation are two alternatives being explored
4.  Both 
involve agricultural water right holders signing leases with cities rather than selling water 
rights.  In a rotational fallowing arrangement, a large group of agricultural water right 
holders sign a long term lease agreement with a municipality and then shift fallowed 
acres from one farm to the next annually to spread lost economic activity over a greater 
landscape.  Limited irrigation strategies include timing irrigations during vegetative 
growth and adopting innovative crop rotations.  Importantly, the limited irrigation 
cropland remains in production so that rural economies suffer reduced impacts vis a vis 
buy and dry activity. 
 
Leasing of this type is rare in Colorado
5, and it is uncertain if leasing markets will evolve. 
Following the example of Michelson and Young (1993), necessary conditions for water 
lease markets include a critical mass of willing leasers and lessees so that both are 
reasonably assured of a mutually beneficial transaction; that the gains from leasing 
exceed the transactions costs; and that leasing contracts can be written, monitored, and 
enforced effectively.  
 
This study examines the viability of water leases, from the perspective of agricultural 
water right holders in the South Platte Basin.  In particular, this study examines  i) 
whether farmers are willing to sign leases if suitably compensated; ii) what remuneration 
is needed for a farmer to enter into a lease agreement; iii) what lease stipulations are 
preferred by farmers; iv) how much water the farmer will release when compensated; and 
v) what characteristics are shared by farmers who are willing to lease. 
 
Research results are particularly useful for policy makers who may need to alter existing 
institutions so that the transactions costs of leases do not outweigh the potential gains 
                                                 
4 With rotational fallowing, a large group of agricultural water right holders sign a long term lease 
agreement with a municipality, but then shift fallowed acres from one farm to the next annually to spread 
lost economic activity over a greater landscape. Limited irrigation decreases a crop’s consumptive use 
without fallowing, and the water savings are leased.  
5Leasing agricultural water to farmers is standard practice in Colorado, and municipal water suppliers do 
frequently lease out of basin water to farmers. These leases do not require legal oversight, but the leases 
described in this section would require approval. from trade.  The results are also of interest to farmers and municipal water providers that 




A questionnaire was mailed to farmers in Colorado’s South Platte River Basin, a basin 
that is experiencing significant population growth in the midst of significant agricultural 
production.   The questionnaire had two main sections: 1) farmer and farm operation 
characteristics, including irrigation water source, the prevailing crop rotation, and 
financial demographics, and 2) attitudes about leasing arrangements, including 
willingness to participate, compensation, and contract provisions.   
 
The questionnaire was mailed to farmers who reported more than fifty irrigated acres in 
the 2002 Census of Agriculture.  Mailing began during the first week of September 2007 
using procedures outlined by Dillman (2007), with a postcard reminder mailed ten days 
later and a second survey mailing twenty one days after the initial mailing. Of the 1,731 
successful mailings, 329 (19%) were returned and could be used in the analysis.  A copy 
of the survey instrument is available from the authors upon request. 
 
A binary logit model identifies the key characteristics that determine which farmers are 
more likely to lease their water.  The necessary components of a functioning water lease 





A leasing market’s success or failure will have much to do with farmers’ attitudes about 
leasing.  Attitudinal surveys are often scored using a Likert scale, which generates data in 
the form of ordered responses.  Probably the most common example, and the one used 
here, is the extent of agreement with a statement, as indicated by selection of one of five 
responses: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly 
agree.  If a respondent strongly agreed with the statement, the response was given a 5 
value, whereas agreed, neutral, disagreed, and strongly disagreed responses were given 
values of 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.  The average rating among survey respondents was 
tabulated, and the percent of those who agreed with the statement (those responding with 
a 5 or 4) was calculated along with the percentage that disagreed with the statement 
(those responding with a 1 or 2).  The results to a subset of the questionnaire’s leasing 
attitude statements are displayed in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.    
 
Figure 1 displays respondents' general beliefs regarding the possibility of water leases.  
As indicated by the figure, fewer than seven percent of respondents expect to sell their 
water rights within five years, which is encouraging—if water sales were more likely, the 
chance of successful water leasing arrangements between farmers and water providers 
would be less likely.  The majority of respondents believe that water leases can be a 
source of revenue for farmers and that water leases are more beneficial to rural 
communities than are water sales.  A smaller majority agrees that water leases will help meet Colorado’s future water needs.  The relative ambivalence toward the success of 
water leases may be because additional reservoir projects, increased municipal 
conservation, and inter basin pipelines are generally supported by Colorado’s agricultural 
organizations, such that respondents may see leases as just one part of the solution to 














agriculture and cities will
meet Colorado's future water
needs
Water leases can be a source
of revenue for farmers
Water leases are more
beneficial to rural
communities than are sales of
water rights
I plan to sell my water rights
within the next five years.
Agree (%) Disagree (%) Neutral (%)
 
Figure 1. Respondents’ general attitudes toward leases 
 
Once it has been established that farmers generally think that water leases are better for 
agricultural communities than are permanent transfers, it remains to be seen if individual 
farmers are themselves willing to enter into a lease agreement.  Figure 2 displays 
respondents' individual willingness to participate in water lease arrangements.  As shown 
in the figure, 61 percent of respondents indicate that they would be willing to sign a lease 
arrangement if suitably compensated, a value that stands a test of internal validity when 
juxtaposed against similar questions occurring later in the survey.   
 
While rotational fallowing is acceptable to 63 percent of respondents, fewer respondents 
were willing to adopt limited irrigation strategies.  Farmers may be more hesitant to adopt 
limited irrigation programs because the agronomical and financial ramifications of such 
programs are less familiar and less certain.  Under limited irrigation, the farmer would be 
trying new crop mixes and/or timings of irrigation timing, etc., that are unfamiliar and 
yield uncertain outcomes.  Under a fallowing program, on the other hand, yields and 
revenues can be better predicted—namely, zero when fallowing and typically expected 
full irrigation values when irrigating.  Additionally, limited irrigation programs may 
require more intense management, which many farmers may find discouraging.  Finding 
the ideal timing and amount of irrigation may prove difficult, and changes in equipment 
and inputs may be necessary. 
 This information is useful to researchers, who have the opportunity to explore the 
expected outcomes of limited irrigation programs.  Indeed, a multidisciplinary group at 
Colorado State University is currently exploring the agronomic and economic 
ramifications of limited irrigation using test plots of land and complex modeling 
systems
6.  This information is also useful for policymakers, who may find greater success 













I am willing to work directly
with municipalities to
establish a water lease
arrangement
I am willing to reduce my
farm's CU by either irrigating
less or planting less-water-
intensive crops as part of a
lease arrangement
I am willing to incorporate a
fallow period into my crop
rotation if compensated
enough
I am willing to lease rather
than sell my water rights
Agree (%) Disagree (%) Neutral (%)
 
Figure 2. Respondents’ willingness to participate in a lease  
 
Figure 3 displays some of the lease provisions desired by respondents.  More respondents 
prefer to lease a portion, rather than all, of their water rights.  Additionally, more 
respondents prefer smaller annual payments rather than one large payment.  Respondents 
are evenly split in their preferences regarding the length of the lease: 32 percent prefer a 
long term lease, 38 percent do not prefer a long term lease, and the remaining thirty 






                                                 














I prefer a long-term lease
(10 or more years)
I am willing to verify water
use with a flow meter or
other device
I prefer one large lease
payment rather than small
annual payments
I prefer to lease all of my
water rights rather than a
smaller portion of my water
rights
Agree (%) Disagree (%) Neutral (%)
 
Figure 3. Lease provisions desired by farmers 
 
Figure 4 displays additional provisions that respondents prefer in leases and the lease 
negotiation process.  Less than half of all respondents are willing to negotiate directly 
with a municipality to lease water, perhaps leaving negotiations to their existing ditch 
companies, mutual associations, or another institution that may evolve in the future.  
Indeed, a greater percentage of respondents are willing to negotiate with other 
organizations when developing lease agreements.  Although the majority of respondents 
responded favorably regarding a willingness to lease, much smaller proportions of 













I am willing to sign a lease
if the water is used to
maintain wildlife habitiat
I am willing to sign a lease
if the water is used to
maintain instream flows for
recreation
I am willing to work with
other organizations to
establish a water lease
arrangement
I am willing to work
directly with municipalities
to establish a water lease
arrangement
Agree (%) Disagree (%) Neutral (%)
 
Figure 4. Respondents’ preferences regarding leasing partners and use of leased water 
 
Based on these stated preferences, respondents have a generally favorable view of the 
impact that leases will have for farmers and rural communities. Many respondents are 
willing to sign leases if suitably compensated. In the next section, attention is focused on 
those survey respondents who were willing to lease or indicated a price at which they 
were willing to lease water
7.  
 
Respondents Willing to Lease: Characteristics, Prices, and Fallowed Land 
Identifying the key characteristics that are shared by South Platte farmers who expressed 
a willingness to lease will help to better forecast how many farmers would be willing to 
participate in a leasing program basin wide, as well as identify potential incentives and 
barriers to water lease markets.  
 
To this end, a binary logit model was used to identify the distinguishing characteristics of 
those farmers who expressed a willingness to lease.  Survey responses of disagree and 
strongly disagree were assigned a value of zero, signifying an unwillingness to lease, 
while responses of agree strongly and agree were assigned a value of one, signifying a 
willingness to lease.  This binary dependent variable was specified to be a linear function 
of the following explanatory variables, plus an error term: 
1.  Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the farmer: age; education 
level; and whether or not the farmer has a second job. 
                                                 
7In one survey section, respondents were asked to indicate if they were willing to enter into a water lease if 
compensated enough, and in a later section respondents were asked to indicate how much they must be 
compensated to forgo irrigation for one year. If respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the former, or 
indicated a lease amount to the latter, then their responses tabulated as potential lessees.  2.  Characteristics of the farm: percent of irrigation water that is groundwater; size of 
farm (as indicated by the number of irrigated acres); farm location (represented by 
a dummy variable for proximity to an urban center). ); and debt (represented by a 
dummy variable for high debt, defined as a debt to asset ratio greater than 0.4). 
3.  Opinions of water leases and agriculture: willingness to work with municipalities 
in arranging lease agreements; willingness to work with other organizations in 
arranging lease agreements; whether the farmer plans to upgrade his/her irrigation 
system dedication; whether or not the farmer plans to sell his/her water rights; and 
whether or not the respondent believes that leases will be more beneficial to rural 
communities vis a vis the outright sale of water rights (an indicator of concern for 
rural communities).  
 
Table 2 displays the results of the ordered logit results from regressing willingness to 
lease on farm and farmer characteristics. Two variables were found to have a statistically 
significant negative impact on willingness to lease: percent groundwater use, high levels 
of which preclude one from leasing water, and proximity to urban centers, which 
suggests increased pressure for urban development and thus a greater chance of selling 
the land and accompanying water rights.   
 
Variables that were found to have a statistically significant positive effect on willingness 
to lease include concern for rural communities, willingness to work with municipalities, 
willingness to work with other organizations, and farming experience, which has a 
positive but diminishing effect on willingness to lease.    
 
General concern for rural communities was measured by degree of agreement with the 
statement, “Water leases are more beneficial to rural economies when compared to the 
sale of water rights.”  In light of the fact that the majority of farmers believe that water 
leases are more beneficial to rural communities than are permanent water transfers, it 
makes sense that farmers who have a general concern for rural communities are more 
willing to lease their water.   
 
A willingness to negotiate directly with municipalities increases a farmer's willingness to 
lease.  Yet, many farmers have long standing feelings of mistrust towards cities and les 
than  half  of  respondents  of  this  survey  indicated  a  willingness  to  work  directly  with 
municipalities.  This leaves opportunity for municipalities to undertake a public relations 
campaign  and/or  for  other  independent  organizations  to  take  on  the  role  of  negotiator 
between municipalities and water rights holders.  Fortunately, a willingness to work with 
other organizations also increases a farmer's willingness to lease, and a greater percentage 
of respondents stated a willingness to work with other organizations when formulating a 
lease agreement. 
 
Finally, the results indicate that willingness to lease increases at a decreasing rate with 
farming experience.  Farmers who haven’t been in the business for long may not be as 
dedicated to the farming lifestyle or tied to the community, and thus may be more apt to 
sell their water rights if the opportunity presented itself.  More experienced farmers likely 
enjoy the lifestyle (otherwise they wouldn’t have been doing it this long) and they have likely invested a large amount of time and money on their farming operation, such that they 
are more willing to enter into a lease agreement if it means being able to keep their farm in 
operation.  However, as experienced is increased further, it has less and less of a positive 
effect on willingness to lease.  Older farmers may be nearing retirement and may have no 
one to pass their farm on to. 
    
Table 2. Farm and farmer characteristics that influence potential participation in water leases  
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  Standard 
Error
8  z-Statistic  Probability 
Constant   4.6203  1.3384   3.4522  0.0006 
Experience*  0.0996  0.0482  2.0649  0.0389 
Experience^2*   0.0012  0.0006   1.9446  0.0518 
Concern for rural communities*  0.9627  0.4189  2.2982  0.0215 
Debt    0.7559  0.4948   1.5278  0.1266 
Second job   0.2365  0.3903   0.6058  0.5446 
Education level  0.0145  0.1519  0.0953  0.9240 
% Groundwater use*   0.0165  0.0065   2.5283  0.0115 
Irrigated acres  0.0004  0.0004  1.0045  0.3152 
Proximity to urban center*   1.6208  0.4303   3.7667  0.0002 
Plan to upgrade irrigation system   0.1247  0.4015   0.3106  0.7561 
Willingness to work with municipalities*  0.5593  0.1845  3.0321  0.0024 
Willingness to work with other orgs*  0.7027  0.2112  3.3273  0.0009 
  
McFadden R squared: 0.2537  H L Statistic:  14.7010  (Pr = 0.0652) 
Log Likelihood:  87.2069  LR Statistic:  59.2991  (Pr =  0.0000) 
Restricted Log Likelihood:   116.8564  Akaike Information Criterion: 1.1518 
*Statistically significant, ρ<0.05  
 
Pricing Water Leases 
The price at which farmers are willing to lease water is important.  As noted previously, a 
necessary condition for leasing to occur is that the gains from leasing, calculated as the 
price difference between the willingness to accept on the part of water right holders and 
the willingness to pay of water providers, must exceed the transactions costs
9 of 
executing the lease.  To address this issue, respondents were asked the minimum price 
they would have to be paid in order to forgo irrigation for one year as part of a leasing 
arrangement  an example of rotational fallowing.  These responses were collected into 
the histogram shown in Figure 5, which measures pricing intervals as column bars whose 
labels refer to the intervals’ uppermost bound.  The proportions of respondents that fall 
within the interval are measured on the vertical axis.  For example, 23 percent of 
respondents indicate a required payment in the range of $50 per acre to $225 per acre. 
                                                 
8 QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariances 
9 Transactions costs include, but are not limited to, the costs of collecting, conveying and treating water, 
legal costs, financing costs of paying the lease, risk premium associated inadequate supplies during 












Figure 5. The minimum lease payments respondents seek for forgoing one year’s irrigation ($/ac). 
 
The vast majority (77 percent) of responses populate an interval between $225 per acre 
and $575 per acre.  A market analogy can be found for the lower end of this interval – at 
the time the survey was received, cash rent for irrigated cropland averaged $300 per acre 
with dryland alternatives netting less than $50 dollars per acre.  The opportunity cost of 
forgoing irrigating cropping can be considered the difference between irrigated and 
dryland cash rents plus the cost of weed management and irrigation equipment 
maintenance.  If this opportunity cost is $300 per acre and two acre feet (AF) of water 
may be leased, then the opportunity cost is valued at $150 per AF.  It follows then that 
the present value of a long term lease, assuming a 5% average rate of return, is $3,000 per 
AF.  Recent sales of water bought and sold for agricultural use in the South Platte Basin 
have traded in the range of $3,000 per AF (Water Colorado). 
 
However, a number of respondents indicated a minimum lease payment of more than 
$1,000 per acre as is indicated in Figure 5.  Following the calculations outlined in the 
previous paragraph, the imputed value of water in this case is $10,000 per AF or more.  
Interestingly, this value is representative of recent water sales of agricultural water bound 
for municipal use (Water Colorado).  Perhaps, then, these farmers are calculating a 
market value for their water rather than a minimum payment to forgo irrigation. 
 
Leased Water Quantities 
Survey respondents state a willingness to lease water and will do so at a price that is 
within the bounds of current water transactions.  It remains to be determined if a 
sufficient amount of water is available to encourage leasing markets to evolve. 
 
In the context of rotational fallowing, respondents were asked to indicate the percent of 
available water they would be willing to commit to an annual lease, the amount of land 






































 that would be fallowed as a result of a lease, and the total irrigated acres that they held.  
On average, respondents will fallow 200 acres per respondent.  A more detailed 
illustration of these responses is found in Figure 6.  The columns labeled on the 
horizontal axis are of two types: the lightly shaded bars indicate the percent of all 
irrigated acres that respondents were willing to fallow in a lease, while the darker bars 
indicate the percent of irrigation water that might be committed to a lease.  For example, 
twelve percent of respondents were willing to fallow fifty percent of their irrigated 
acreage as part of a leasing agreement, while twenty percent of respondents were willing 
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Percent Irrigated Acres Fallowed Percent of Water Leased  
 
 
Figure 6. Respondents’ percent of all irrigated acres fallowed and the percent of all water supplies 
committed to an annual lease. 
 
In examining Figure 6, respondents tend to cluster into two groups – those that are 
willing to commit all of their land and water to a lease (right hand side of the figure), and 
those that are willing to commit half of their holdings or less to a leasing arrangement.  
It is encouraging that one third of respondents are willing to lease all of their water  this 
provides evidence that there would be sufficient water supplied to make the transaction 
economically viable, since it would likely cost more to collect, treat, and transport water 
from many small sources than a few large sources.   
 
At the same time, it is encouraging that not all respondents fall into this cluster, as that 
would leave little water in agriculture, and would yield similar impacts as a 'buy and dry' 
scenario.  Respondents in the left hand cluster are likely to stay in farming, which will 
provide economic activity and help avoid the ‘hot spot’ problem of concentrated clusters 








































Percent Land Fallowed and Water Leased  In total, respondents indicated they would fallow 33,352 acres.  This would free between 
50,000 and 67,000 AF of water annually
10, an amount that is likely sufficient to make 
leasing a viable option for cities.  This amount could fill approximately fifteen percent of 
cities' total needs; thus, it won’t entirely solve the problem but will go long way to help it. 
 
In the present analysis, water is characterized as a homogeneous commodity, while in 
reality the prior appropriations doctrine creates a heterogeneous water product whose 
value varies with the seniority of its appropriation.  A leasing market may thus prove to 
be too “thin” if the water made available by farmers is of relatively junior priority, and 
municipal water providers instead seek scarcer, senior water rights.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Reallocation of water from agricultural to municipal use is inevitable given the rapid 
population growth of the heavily urbanized West.  These water transfers are controversial 
largely because they may fallow large swaths of irrigated lands that often make up a 
significant portion of the local rural economic base.  In place of these ‘buy and dry’ 
transfers, stakeholders are interested in the opportunity to create water leasing markets to 
partially meet future demands. 
 
Analysis of the stated preferences of South Platte farmers who answered a questionnaire 
mailed in September 2007 indicates that a significant amount of water may be leased at a 
reasonable price.  The majority of respondents believe that leases can be a source of 
revenue for farmers and that rural communities are better off with leasing arrangements 
relative to permanent water transfers.  When asked to indicate the minimum price they 
must be paid in order to forgo irrigation for one year as part of a leasing arrangement, the 
majority of responses populate an interval between $225 per acre and $575 per acre.  In 
sum, respondents indicated they would fallow 33,352 acres (an average of 200 acres per 
respondent).  Important characteristics of those willing to lease include having more 
farming experience, having concern for rural communities, and being willing to work 
with municipalities and other organizations to orchestrate lease agreements. 
 
Before leasing markets evolve in the South Platte Basin, the willingness to pay of 
municipal water suppliers needs to be revealed and the transactions costs of leasing 
markets needed to be examined.  Transactions costs have been measured by Colby (1990) 
but an update is needed to determine if leasing arrangements incur the same costs as 
permanent water transfers. 
                                                 
10 Actual amount will depend on how water courts evaluate their historical consumptive use. REFERENCES 
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